Abstract Major economic crises may promote structural reforms, by increasing the cost of the status quo, or hinder them, by inducing more demand for protection. The ideology and political partisanship of the ruling government may be crucial in determining the prevailing course of action. In good times, conservative parties are typically pro-reform. However, do these parties try to exploit periods of crisis to carry out their reforms? Do social-democratic parties support even greater social protection? To answer these questions, this paper uses indicators of structural reforms in the labor, product, and financial markets for 25 OECD countries over the period. The empirical analysis confirms the ambiguous effect of crises: product markets are liberalized, but financial markets become more regulated. Partisan politics also matters, as right parties are associated with more pro-market reforms. Yet, crises modify partisan politics: rightwing parties refrain from promoting privatizations, and oppose the introduction of greater financial market regulations. By contrast, center parties liberalize and trim unemployment benefits generosity, while left parties privatize. Furthermore, weak, fractionalized governments, which are associated with more regulated product markets, are also more likely to liberalize during a crisis.
workers in the case of a privatization), and only diffuse, long-term gains. Crises may thus lead to more government intervention in the economy.
Whether, in response to a crisis, pro-market structural reforms are adopted or the role of the state in the economy expands ultimately depend on political and electoral factors. Political partisanship, for instance, shapes a government's policies and its willingness to reform. In particular, conservative governments are more likely to eliminate existing anti-competitive measures, and hence to promote pro-market reforms. A government's strength in Parliament may also affect the ability to carry out reforms.
Does the role of political partisanship in promoting, or hindering, reforms change during a crisis? If we extend the claim made in the partisan politics literature (see section 2) to times of economic crisis, we should expect conservative parties (more market-oriented for ideological and electoral reasons) to be keen to take advantage of periods of crisis to put forward their reform strategies. Socialdemocratic (left) parties, on the other hand, would be even less keen on reforms in troubled economic times, reluctant as they are to pile additional strains on their voters.
To test this claim, this paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of labor, product, and financial market reforms in 25 OECD countries over the period. I use recent data on OECD indicators for labor and product markets. Product-market indicators measure the level of anticompetitive regulation and the degree of public ownership in seven nonmanufacturing industries (electricity and gas supply, road freight, air passenger transport, rail transport, postal delivery and telecommunications). Labor-market indicators capture (1) the degree of employment protection legislation, which assesses the restrictions placed on the firing processes by labor legislation and collective bargaining agreements; and (2) the unemployment benefit replacement rate, a measure of welfare state generosity. Furthermore, for retirement policies, OECD data on the implicit tax on continuing to work for individuals aged between 60 and 64 year old are used. These taxes provide a measure of the individual cost of postponing retirement. The financial market liberalization indicator is provided by the IMF, and reports policy changes across seven different dimensions: credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking sector, policies respecting securities markets, prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector, and restrictions on capital account.
The empirical analysis focuses on the role of major economic crises and of political partisanship in promoting, or perhaps hindering, reforms. But, special emphasis is placed on the politics of economic crises by examining how parties or governments of different political orientations or strengths react to them.
The empirical findings show that crises may both enhance and hinder reforms.
Budget deficits, a common denominator in economic crises, promote liberalization in product markets, while severe economic recessions increase regulation in financial markets. The crucial role of partisan politics is confirmed in OECD countries, particularly for product and labor market reforms.
Conservative governments appear to be associated with both liberalization and privatization in product markets, and with less generous welfare states. However, partisan politics vary during crises. In times of economic turmoil, right parties seem to adopt a more moderate strategy: they refrain from promoting reforms, and oppose the introduction of greater financial market regulation. By contrast, center governments introduce liberalization measures and reduce unemployment benefits, while left-wing governments exploit crises by privatizing.
Empirical analysis confirms that other features of ruling governments also matter.
Fractionalized governments -i.e., governments supported by a coalition of different parties-are associated with more product market regulations. Again, periods of crisis modify the politics of reform. Indeed, during an economic crisis, fractionalized governments become more inclined to liberalize product markets.
Additional evidence shows that governments that have been in power for a long time, and may therefore be responsible for the status-quo policy, are less prone to liberalize product markets during crises.
These empirical results extend previous findings by Brooks and Kurtz (2007) on the influence of economic crises on different markets and countries, and evidence by Allan and Scruggs (2004) on political partisanship, to different markets and sectors. Perhaps surprisingly, economic crises emerge as unusual periods, during which political parties are willing to cross ideological lines, to contradict their traditional political creeds, and to act exceptionally. The fact that left-wing parties are willing to privatize, and center parties to liberalize and reduce welfare state generosity, suggests that, during a crisis, these parties may learn the true cost of these non-competitive regulations, and can credibly convey it to their electorate (see Cukierman and Tommasi 1998) . On the contrary, conservative parties are less inclined to reform in tough economic times, possibly to avoid being blamed as ultra-liberal -and thus having to face an electoral backlash. Even so, they do oppose higher financial market regulations.
Related literature
There exists a large empirical literature on the policy response to economic crises.
Looking back at the aftermath of the Great Depression, Shughart (2011) depicts the New Deal as a counterproductive policy response driven by electoral concerns. Similarly, Higgs (1987) identifies a ratchet effect in policy responses to major crises, such as the two World Wars and the Great Depression, that led to a huge increase in government intervention. Focusing on more recent events, Drazen and Easterly (2001) analyze inflation and black market premia to conclude that crises spur reforms. Duval and Elmeskov (2005) construct an aggregate indicator of labor-market reforms to show that crises (defined as a sharp rise in the output gap and higher unemployment rates) are associated with reforms. The empirical evidence in IMF(2004) suggests instead that an ongoing economic crisis may actually hinder labor market reforms, although the length of past economic crises may promote them. Using disaggregated indicators, Hoj et al. (2006) provide evidence that the direction of reforms differs for insiders and outsiders: large increases in the long-term unemployment rate are associated with less employment protection legislation for temporary workers and with more generous unemployment benefits, but have no effect on employment protection legislation for permanent workers. Tompson (2009) analyzes 20 case studies of OECD countries to conclude that labor market reforms were not correlated with economic crises. Using financial market indicators, Abiad and Mody (2005) show that different economic crises lead to different outcomes: a balance of payment crisis spurs reforms, but a banking crisis stands in the way of liberalizations.
The interaction between politics and structural reforms has also been extensively analyzed. Allan and Scruggs (2004) concentrate on the welfare state -namely on the rates of unemployment benefit replacement and sickness transfers -to show that, after the mid-1980s, political partisanship matters, since retrenchments have been more likely under right-wing governments. Murillo and Martinez-Gallardo (2007) and Murillo (2009) study market reforms in the Latin American public utilities sector, to conclude that ideological polarization and political competition have a bearing on reforms. Brooks and Kurtz (2007) , for their part, examine capital account and trade liberalization in 19 Latin American countries. They find that crises do matter, but not always enough to promote liberalization. Capital account openings occur during good economic times, while trade liberalization occurs in positive trade-balance and/or hyperinflation contexts. Moreover, the former is more likely to occur with fractionalized governments, where blame can be shared.
An analysis of the politics of crisis and its impact on reforms was also the objective of Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi (2006) . They study the stabilization of budget deficits and inflation rates to conclude that crises promote fiscal reforms and adjustments -hence, the politics of crisis matters. Furthermore, strong and new governments act faster. Pop-Eleches (2008) examines Latin American and Eastern European countries to suggest that an economic crisis carries substantial weight, but how much weight depends on the government's partisan color.
Finally, in two recent papers, Congleton (2009 and 2012) first studies the political and economic determinants of the 2008 financial crisis, and then turns to the policy responses in order to evaluate the relevance of public choice in explaining the crisis management and to discuss the economics and politics of "crisis insurance" programs.
Reform patterns
At least until the 2008 financial and economic crisis, there seemed to be a growing consensus over the need for structural reforms in many countriesreforms designed to improve disappointing growth and to face emerging challenges, such as aging, new technologies, and globalization. Nevertheless, the implementation of structural reforms over the past few decades has varied considerably in pace and magnitude across countries, but also nationwide, across markets.
OECD indicators on anti-competitive regulation in seven non-manufacturing sectors show that the timing and intensity of product market reforms have been very different across countries. Figure 1 suggests that product market liberalization (measured as a reduction in the anti-competitive regulation index) took off in the late 1980s and is still on-going. Yet, different trends have emerged.
The United States already was implementing comprehensive reforms in 1975-85, while the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Norway and, to a lesser extent, Canada, Finland and Austria followed in the early to mid-1980s. For most other European countries, product market liberalization was introduced in the 1990s under the influence of the EU's internal market program, as well as accession to the Euro zone (see Alesina et al. 2009 ). Across sectors, liberalizations started with road transport, later to spread to the air transport industry and, from the mid-1990s, to the electricity and telecommunications sectors (see Conway and Nicoletti 2006) . Figure   6 ). Reforms aimed at postponing retirement age only came later, from the early 1990s; this was the case in Italy (1992 ( , 1995 ( ), Germany (1992 ( , 1997 and France (2003) . Increases in the actual retirement age were pursued by legislating rises in the legal (statutory) retirement age, and by reducing the incentives to retire early. Figure 7 shows that Italy and Sweden, and to a lesser extent Belgium, France and Germany, were particularly effective in curbing the incentives to retire early, as measured by the implicit tax levied on workers aged 60 to 64 years who continued to hold jobs.
Economic and political determinants of reforms

Economic crises
The economic and political literature on structural policies has long suggested that economic crises may prompt the adoption of reform measures (see Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Drazen 2000) . Deep economic crises call for quick reactions.
Whether or not this actually translates into reform measures will depend on the perception of the sort of change needed. Macroeconomic stabilization following hyperinflation or a budget crisis may more readily be achieved (Rodrik 1996) , either because it is easier to agree on the necessary policy -as in the case of trade opening after hyperinflation (Brooks and Kurtz 2007) -or because the crisis itself was the result of a war of attrition between socioeconomic groups, where the losing side ends up bearing the costs of stabilization (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Drazen and Grilli 1993) . Crises often induce expansionary policies and more government intervention in the economy (Perotti 1999; Shughart 2011 ).
An economic crisis may also promote structural reforms, if existing institutions or regulations are recognized to be, at least partially, responsible for the deterioration of the economic conditions. For instance, in countries with more stringent labor market regulations and more generous early-retirement provisions, reforms of pension schemes and labor market become much more urgent. Yet, generous programs are also known to induce a status-quo bias, by creating their own political constituencies made up of the beneficiaries of such programs and bureaucrats. By raising the cost of the status quo, crises may impose a sense of urgency to reform, if there is sufficient consensus that structural reforms may lead to recovery and boost potential output. In particular, worsening economic conditions, together with the release of relevant and reliable information on the cost of the status quo (Tompson 2009 ), may help to weaken the resistance of the pro-status-quo coalitions (Nelson 1990 (Nelson , 1994 , and persuade risk-averse individuals, who are uncertain about the distribution of future benefits and costs deriving from reforms (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Laban and Sturzenegger 1994) .
However, crises may also hamper pro-market reforms. In fact, during an economic crisis, individuals and socioeconomic groups will be less willing to lose their rents or benefits, unless alternative compensations are available.
Furthermore, costly compensatory reform packages are more difficult to finance during economic crises -particularly when crises are associated with fiscal imbalances. So, while reforms aimed at a more efficient labor market may be badly needed when unemployment rates are high, the economic crisis itself may also delay reform measures. Indeed, more policy flexibility can be seen as imposing adjustment costs on (other) workers already suffering from adverse economic conditions (Bean 1998). Likewise, a debt crisis may lead to nationalization, additional regulation, and capital market closure (Edwards 1995) in order to limit episodes of capital flight (Brooks and Kurtz 2007) , while major crises may trigger great reversals in financial liberalization (Rajan and Zingales 2003) . Finally, the Great Depression led to more government intervention in the economy and to more public spending (Higgs 1987; Shughart 2011) .
Political partisanship and electoral constraints
For reform attempts to succeed, governments need to use their political capital to overcome the resistance from within government itself, from opposition parties, and from crucial veto players in society, such as labor unions or employers' organizations (Tsebelis 2002) . Several political and institutional features affect a government's incentives to reform, and ultimately its reform strategy. Besides economic crises, ideological and electoral motivations, too, may drive policymakers to commit to a reform pattern.
The literature on political partisanship suggests that different political parties have divergent policy preferences, as each party tries to appeal to its own constituency.
Hence, parties actively pursue different policies when in office (Boix 1998; Garrett 1998) . Conservative governments are expected to adopt efficiencyenhancing policies to reduce the role of the public sector in the economy through welfare state retrenchments and privatizations; but also to liberalize financial and product markets (Abiad and Mody 2005; Brooks and Kurtz 2007) . Left-wing governments emphasize instead equity and redistributive factors, and may therefore wish to expand the welfare state and social spending. Contrary to this view, however, a credibility argument has been put forward to explain why some governments have successfully promoted reforms in sharp contrast to the preferences of their core political constituencies as well as, often, with their own electoral platforms (Cukierman and Tommasi 1998) . If voters are unable to verify whether a reform policy is pursued for purely ideological reasons or because it is economically expedient, they will more readily believe that economic motivations prevail if, for instance, liberalizations are introduced by a left-wing government.
While the expansion of the welfare state and the introduction of protective labor market institutions have often been associated with the rising power of left-wing parties and trade unions (Esping-Andersen 1990), the retrenchment phase that started in the 1990s has not been linked to partisan politics (Pierson 1994) .
Similarly, no partisan political preference has been identified as a main driver of market reforms in Latin America in the 1990s (Stokes 2001; Weyland 2002) .
However, this view has recently been challenged by Allan and Scruggs (2004) , who detected a significant impact of right-wing governments on the welfare state retrenchment efforts that took place after 1980. It has also been challenged by Murillo and Martinez-Gallardo (2007) , who emphasize the importance of political A different strand of literature has emphasized the role of the electorate in determining economic policies and regulatory measures. In this case, policymakers are identified with opportunistic, non-partisan incumbent politicians, hoping to achieve re-election, or with the parties backing candidates for public office drafting political platforms. In both cases, politicians have personal interests in supporting economic policies that are supported by a majority of the voters, or by the voters who are more easily convinced by the policies -the swing voters (Stromberg 2008) .
In this sense, a government's tenure in office and the expected time to the next election may affect the reform process. In the lead-up to a general election, a government may refrain from implementing reform policies with large short-term costs, but it may be more in favor of policies with short-term benefits -and viceversa with newly elected governments. Well-functioning financial markets may, however, bring forward the long-term benefits of reforms, thereby helping reformist governments to pursue their strategies (Buti et al. 2008) . A government's political strength may also affect its willingness and ability to reform. Weak, fragmented governments, which can count only on the support of a minority or a coalition in Parliament, are not well equipped to pursue reforms (Brooks and Kurtz 2007) . Indeed, they may manage to implement policy changes, although their strategy will have to be founded on a broader base for reforms.
Conversely, strong governments may rely on their supporting political majorities.
These considerations regarding the electoral costs and gains from reforming are remarkably appropriate for broad policy measures, such as retirement and labor market policies, which naturally affect many individuals, and may potentially have major electoral repercussions. Pension reforms are known to carry heavy political costs, since the elderly, who are to suffer a cut-back, are "single-minded" (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1999; Profeta 2002 ) over social security benefits. In fact, while pension benefits comprise a large share of an elderly retiree's income, the interests of other (younger) individuals tend to be more diversified, as they depend on their family status, occupation, income, and so on.
Recent research has downplayed the role of the median voter in determining economic policy, and drawn attention to organized pressure groups and to partisan allies within the party structure (Nielson 2003) . This approach seems particularly well suited for addressing the liberalization of product and financial markets, which may drive up costs for those who stand to lose from the reform, and yield only small, diffuse benefits for the winners.
Macroeconomic policy and external constraints
Monetary policy may affect structural reforms. In particular, to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime, or a single currency (e.g., the case of the Euro), a country has to relinquish control of monetary policy, which then prevents from using this policy to accommodate negative shocks. This may create incentives to pursue structural reforms (such as liberalizations in the labor and product market) in order to stimulate market-based adjustments (Bean 1998; Duval and Elmeskov 2005; Obstfeld 1997 ). On the other hand, Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2000) argue that, under a currency union, such as the European Monetary System, the up-front cost of structural reforms may increase, since the use of expansionary aggregate demand policies to accompany structural reforms becomes more limited, owing to fiscal constraints and lack of monetary authority.
Openness to trade has also been recognized as an important determinant of liberalization (IMF 2004) . This is because more globalized countries are open to competition, which creates demand for more flexibility, but also for more protection. Small countries, which rely heavily on foreign trade, tend to implement more reforms (Duval and Elmeskov 2005) .
Reforms may be induced, not only by economic crises, but also by supranational constraints imposed by international agreements or treaties -the European Union (EU) is a case in point. These have been instrumental in strengthening domestic competition (especially in the service sector) or creating domestic institutions that stimulate reform (e.g., antitrust or sectoral regulatory authorities). The implementation of the EU's Single Market Program has pursued the removal of remaining barriers to trade and FDI (often resulting in the abolition or reduction of subsidies and protection).
Empirical analysis
Measuring reforms
I consider structural reforms in product, labor and financial markets in 25 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
To measure product market reforms, I use data on anti-competitive regulations for the period 1975-2007 collected by Conway and Nicoletti (2007) , and described in detail in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) . These regulatory indicators measure restrictions on competition and private sector governance in seven nonmanufacturing industries: electricity and gas supply, road freight, air passenger transport, rail transport, post and telecommunications (fixed and mobile) -on a scale from zero (the least restrictive) to six (the most restrictive). The overall index of regulation includes information on entry barriers, public ownership, market shares of the dominant player(s) (in the telephone, gas and railroad sectors), and price controls (in the road freight industry). In particular, entry barriers cover legal limitations on the number of companies in potentially competitive markets and rules on the vertical integration of network industries.
Public ownership measures the share of equity owned by central or municipal governments in firms of a given sector between two polar cases: no public ownership (indicator takes value zero) and full public ownership (value of six). In the benchmark regressions, I use two indices of overall regulation. A regulatory indicator, which does not include public ownership, is obtained by averaging, in each of the seven industries, the indicators of barriers to entry, market shares of new entrants, and price controls; whereas an indicator that includes only public ownership information is a simple average of public ownership over the seven industries. The index also provides a measure of the regulation of fixed-term contracts and temporary-work agencies, which captures the restrictions on the use of temporary employees. The employment legislation for regular contracts constitutes the core component of the overall summary index of EPL strictness that we use. The indicator of the extent of insurance coverage provided in redundancy cases is based on the unemployment benefit replacement rate, namely, the ratio of the unemployment benefit to the last wage. In particular, I concentrate on the average of the unemployment benefit replacement rates of a worker with average labor income over a three-year unemployment spell. given by the number of years that a government (namely the chief executive) has been in office, both in current and previous administrations. A complementary index of the government's weakness is given by its degree of fractionalization, which measures the probability that two members of Parliament picked at random among the government's parties are from different parties.
To measure (major) crises, I consider situations in which the output gap, defined as the difference between actual output and potential output, is below the 90th percentile of the empirical density (which is equal -3.4%). Data on output gap are from the OECD's Economic Outlook database. In our sample, this definition produces a total of 76 crises, as detailed in Table 1 . In these country-year observations, the dummy variable (crisis) takes a value of one. EU membership is defined as a dummy variable set to one when a country is a member of the European Union (after 1999), while the EU's single market program dummy is set equal to one when a country is in the EU's Single Market Program (after 1993).
Government fiscal position is measured by the share of government net lending relative to GDP. The degree of openness of a country, on the other hand, is given by the ratio between the sum of imports and exports to GDP. The degree of efficiency of the financial markets is measured by the stock market capitalization as a share of GDP, which is available only after 1988. These data are from the OECD Economic Outlook database. Table 2 presents the summary statistics for these variables.
Empirical strategy
The dependent variables used in the econometric analysis correspond to the annual variations in the policy indicators described above for the product, labor and financial markets. The explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis were divided into three groups: economic factors (including a crisis dummy), political factors, and interactions between crisis and politics. Regression analyses based on panel cross-country/time-series data are associated with well-known drawbacks (Beck and Katz 1995) . The specifications used for this model try to address some of these issues. First, since the reform indicators are very persistent (particularly, the labor market regulation indicators), the above specification includes a lagged dependent variable. Second, all the economic and political explanatory variables are also lagged. This is explained by the need to deal, in part at least, with simultaneity bias problems; but also to account for the fact that it takes time for politicians to respond to shocks, and that there is an obvious lag between the beginning of the (political) reform process and its implementation. Third, country and time fixed effects are used in all regressions, to account for unobserved heterogeneity at country and year level. This allows one to filter out of the analysis country-or year-specific unobserved components, and thus to identify the effects of crises and political variables from withincountry rather than from 'cross-countries variations. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable and of country-and year-fixed effects clearly represents a conservative strategy.
Finally, in interpreting the empirical results, it is worth noticing that while the direct effect of political partisanship on reforms may suffer from an omitted variable problem, this limitation is less severe when the effect is analyzed during an economic crisis. For instance, a positive correlation between conservative governments and reform policies may be driven by an underlying economic, social or political process (such as a need to reduce the role of the state in the economy) that leads the voters to elect conservative governments precisely because they want reforms to be implemented. However, unless one believes that major economic crises are either easily predicted by the voters, or voluntarily generated by governments, the reaction of conservative governments to a major, unexpected crisis identifies the true effect of these government characteristics on policy reforms, at least during crises. This justifies the emphasis on the role of political partisanship in a crisis.
Results
The first objective of this empirical analysis was to assess the bearing of Finally, countries belonging to the Euro zone are associated with greater liberalization of the product market and more generous unemployment benefit replacement rates, while access to the European Single Market leads to product market liberalizations and privatizations. Interestingly, the degree of trade openness is weakly associated with more rigid labor market, suggesting that more international competition may actually increase demand for protection. Table 4 shows that these results are robust to controlling for the degree of efficiency of the financial markets, although these data are available only after 1988.
To examine the relevance of partisan politics during economic crises, Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis that include as explanatory variable Again, the inclusion of stock market capitalization does not modify the results (see table 6 ).
Do other political factors become more or less relevant during an economic crisis?
To address this question, tables 7 and 8 show the results of the regression analyses that include as explanatory variable the interaction between the (lagged) crisis indicator and, respectively, the (lagged) numbers of years in office for the current government, and the (lagged) level of government fractionalization. In both cases, the importance of these political factors increases during an economic crisis, but only for product market regulations. In particular, although they are associated with more regulated product markets, during a crisis fractionalized governments apparently become more keen to implementing reform measures. Conversely, governments that have been in power longer, and may thus be responsible for the status-quo policy, are less apt to liberalize product markets during economic crises.
All results are robust to dropping the top-and bottom-two ranked countries for each dependent variable.
Concluding remarks
Using a large dataset of structural reforms in the labor, product, and financial Perhaps more interestingly, the empirical analysis conducted in this paper has uncovered an additional effect of political partisanship on structural reforms.
Political parties propose radically different responses to economic crises.
Moreover, these responses also differs from their usual political orientations in good economic times. In particular, the empirical findings suggest that during crises, right-wing governments refrain from promoting reforms, but they also object to stepping up financial market regulations. During major economic crises, it is center and left-wing governments that contribute more substantially to reforms. The former liberalize product markets and retrench unemployment benefit generosity; the latter privatize. These results seem to suggest that economic crises are unusual periods, during which reforms may be more necessary in order to boost economic efficiency, and yet less palatable to individuals (and firms) facing tough times. In these situations, parties ideologically less ready to reform (in good times) may accordingly be more credible in convincing stakeholders -i.e., workers, voters, and unions -of the costs involved in these non-competitive regulations and of the need to reform.
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